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At the beginning of December 2018, American rapper 
Lil Nas X published in the social video sharing 
application TikTok a song entitled “Old Town Road". 
The song itself is not particularly sophisticated (the 
author used someone else's sample,1 the chorus consists 
of two sentences, and the whole song is based on 
simple repetitions), it is however very catchy. The song 
about American cowboy riding a horse became so 
popular that it quickly entered the charts from social 
media. However, when the song was removed after 
reaching number fourth on the Billboard magazine's 
"Hot Country Songs" list, because it "did not embrace 
enough elements of today’s country music",2 it become 
one of the hottest discussed hits concerning race, 
gender3 and classification of artistic creativity. This 
short example shows the tendency of mismatch 
between the existing designs and classifications and the 
contemporary artistic forms and social needs. This 
trend can also be observed in the area of copyright law 
and it has become an inspiration for this paper. The 
purpose of this essay is to analyse and consider the 
inclusion of aesthetic concepts in the legal assessment 
of the work of art, and an attempt to solve the 
problematic issue of the definition of a work of art. 
Such a multidisciplinary approach could in fact 
improve the difficult situation in which the concept of 
copyright is today.  
My theory, which I would like to discuss, is the 
possibility of referring to modern theoretical models 
taken from aesthetics or combining such models, 
adapting them to the needs of the legal system. Why 
not choosing various, multidisciplinary ways of 
combining theoretically distant areas of social 
sciences? 
In support of this theory, the arguments based on a 
brief analysis of contemporary trends in aesthetics are 
provided in first part, the manifestations or 
similarities between them in the existing legal 
interpretations are discussed in part two. In the final 
part, whether consider - and if so, to what extent - the 
implementation of new aesthetic approaches could be 
helpful in the system of copyright and what lessons 
can be drawn for the future are analyzed.It is not 
intended to present a ready-made and coherent legal 
and philosophical concept. The intention is only to 
provide an inspiration for further discussion and 
consideration of the redefinition of known and 
practically inviolable concepts of copyright. The 
assumption is the need to include a multidisciplinary 
and more holistic approach to legal interpretation of 
the issue, especially in relation to challenges posed by 
modern technologies. 
 
Copyright Law at the Crossroads  
Neither international provisions (in particular the 
Berne Convention) nor EU directives determine how the 
work protected by copyright should be implemented into 
the legal system. However, we can make certain 
assumptions on the basis of these regulations: the 
originality requirement, idea/expression dichotomy, or 
the fixation. National legislators are supposed to deal 
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with detailed solutions on the basis of developed legal 
traditions. However, due to the more widespread 
changes, solutions on a global scale4 are required, 
regardless of whether the solution implemented is based 
on enumerative list of works5 or an open catalogue of 
protected works.6 Initially, it was exemplified by 
excluding from the protection significant artistic 
creations (e.g. works of M. Duchamp, R. 
Rauschenberg,7 or Walter De Maria8), over time the 
tendency became visible in a number of decisions 
granting copyright protection to works with intended 
purposes entirely different from artistic (e.g. technical 
works, documentaries, utility or industrial products). It 
was due to the requirement of judicial aesthetic 
neutrality towards the work: a judge should never 
engage in judgement of aesthetic value of such work.
9 
While this risk has been included in the legal system so 
far, nowadays it is higher as a result of technological 
changes and the emergence of new, "products" of key 
economic importance offered to users that basically are 
not protected, including: algorithms, big data, know-how 
or artificial intelligence products.10 
 
Additionally, neither of modern legal models 
seems to refer to the recipient of the work: either in 
the process of determining whether we are dealing 
with a protected work or the scope of exclusive rights 
granted to its author, so far no consideration has been 
given as to what impact this will have on legal 
situation of the users.11 In particular, it is not 
determined how it will affect the possibility of 
exercising the freedom of expression, the freedom of 
artistic expression or the freedom to conduct business. 
Legislative works on the latest EU directive regarding 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single 
Market (DSM12) indicate, however, the growing 
importance of this overlooked element of the legal 
system.13 
 
As a matter of fact, the construction of the subject 
of copyright protection fails on many levels. It is hard 
to imagine, however, that the existing regulations 
could be replaced with the new ones, deprived of 
abstract elements or not invoking doubts as to 
interpretations: to a certain extent generalisations are 
and will be indispensable, which will affect the 
lability of the case law. Emphasis should be put 
directly on the case-law itself and the manner of 
interpretation. This could be achieved through the 
development of permanent and unchanging copyright 
paradigms, to which the assessment of the facts could 
refer, as a last resort, such as a high level of protection 
of creativity, respect for minority rights, etc. This 
solution, however, will actually shift the severity of 
the problem to other, equally undefined criteria, 
which - as can be seen, for example, taking into 
account the interests of users of works - are also 
constantly evolving. Therefore, it is necessary to 
ensure the balance between existing structures by 
broadening their interpretative field with factors that 
have been overlooked so far, which will remove to 
some extent the burden of interpretation from the 
case-law. Among the factors that can tip the balance 
are those taken into account in aesthetics when 
defining the concept of a work of art (WoA). 
 
Aesthetics: A Highway to Modern Art? 
Two contemporary aesthetic concepts: 
functionalism and institutionalism arouse a lot of 
interest, although in addition to them other equally 
interesting theories are also discussed.14 According to 
the first approach, a work of art can be understood by 
reference to the effect that an artistic product makes.15 
The main representative of this view was  
M. Beardsley, who defined a WoA as an arrangement 
of conditions intended to be capable of affording an 
aesthetic experience (at a later stage this definition 
was supplemented by: an arrangement belonging to a 
class or type of arrangements that is typically 
intended to have this capacity)16. According to this 
approach, the assessment of the work is determined 
by external factors, first of all (1) the author’s 
intention to create a work capable of providing 
aesthetic experience or the intention to create a work 
that provides a possible aesthetic experience (2) 
aesthetic experience that results from the author's 
intentional actions.17 According to M. Beardsley's 
theory everyday objects, technical works, industrial or 
functional works should not be considered 
WoA.18Subsequently the following provision was 
added stating that the definition of a work of art does 
not only refer to situations where the author's main 
intention is to create a WoA, but also includes the 
cases where the created work is intended for utility 
purposes, but at the same time the author of the work 
expresses the need to produce artistic effect (as e.g. in 
case of creating a unique furniture or clothing 
design).19 The author’s intention to provide an 
aesthetic character is the basic point of reference for 
the assessment of the nature of a WoA and may 
manifest itself in the use of appropriate means of 
artistic expression, in the title of the work or in the 
application of appropriate artistic conventions. So it's 




not about the subjective intention, but its 
manifestations that can be verified by an external 
recipient.20 
The concept of including the artist's intention into a 
WoA status is limited only to this status: the intention 
to create a work does not extend to the intention of 
giving it a specific meaning and it does not imply that 
the work will eventually be interpreted according to 
the meaning initially intended by the artist.21 It means 
that the intention to create a work of art does not have 
to be successful. According to this view attention is 
paid to artistic conventions and the manner of creating 
a work of art.22 They have material impact on the 
assessment of the intention expressed by the author - 
making reference to them, using typical means of 
expression is one of the visible manifestations of the 
intention to create a WoA. On the other hand, artistic 
conventions do not constitute an unchanging and 
constant group, imposed from the top down by the 
Artworld, they are always related to current trends 
and they undergo certain changes. 
The functionalist approach was criticised mainly 
due to inconsistent definition of the second element of 
the concept of WoA: Aesthetic experience.23Although 
M. Beardsley presented various phenomenological 
approaches on how to determine whether we are 
dealing with an aesthetic experience, but these were 
not satisfactory solutions.24  Interestingly, the 
criticism focused on the definition of the concept of 
aesthetic experience due to the conceptual 
engagement of third parties in the relationship with 
the work in order to determine its status as a work of 
art - it was criticised, i.e., for being subjective and 
imprecise - but not the concept of including the study 
of the artist's intention or consciousness at the time of 
creating the work. As A. Danto rightly argued25 an 
aesthetic experience is significantly affected by the 
recipient's awareness that he is dealing with a WoA - 
and this contradicts the objectivity of this criterion. 
The functionalist approach also fails as regards some 
of the works of conceptual art: especially those in 
which the author takes objects from real life and uses 
them solely for the purposes of criticising artistic 
trends (M. Duchamp, Fountain or Can Opener).26 
According to M. Beardsley's concept, the status of a 
WoA arises as soon as the work of art is constituted 
and is unchanged, while the use of elements already 
existing in real life and their accidental combination 
should not in itself determine the nature of the 
product.27 
The implementation of the functional approach to 
the term of a WoA is not entirely possible under 
copyright law. Relying solely on the study of the 
creator's intention and the aesthetic experience of the 
recipient of the work can involve the risk of 
subjectivity and legal uncertainty, but also a 
particularly complex process,28 which requires at least 
an expert's opinion. However, the functionalist 
approach has many advantages. First and foremost, it 
takes into account an intention of the artist, so far 
completely overlooked, as a key element when 
assessing whether the intellectual product has the 
properties of the work. This would allow the 
provision of copyright protection of works that have 
not been protected by copyright so far (such as 
conceptual art or intellectual products that were 
created with a high intellectual effort, but do not meet 
some of the requirements for copyright protection), 
and exclusion of copyright protection in cases where 
such protection was already used (i.e. everyday items 
or objects of a purely functional or technical character 
- providing them with copyright protection will result 
in an increase of economic costs).  
 
As in any other case, certain specific modifications 
would be necessary to offer the best solution. We 
should exclude situations where objects of everyday 
use (created exclusively for functional purposes), after 
being placed on the market or being published, gain 
aesthetic value and this is the only reason why their 
creators should apply for a status of a work of art. 
Depending on the decision of the legislator (which 
would probably mean a refusal to protect such objects 
with copyright), such cases could be avoided by 
appropriate determination which moment is the most 
relevant in order to specify the artist's intention. It 
seems that the moment of creation of such object 
would be the most significant, not its publication or 
functioning on the market. Obviously, this means that 
the works that gained popularity long after their 
dissemination shall be excluded from copyright 
protection, unless it is proved that at the time of their 
creation an artist's intention was to create an artistic 
effect. However, it raises the problem, which may be 
exemplified by the song "Threnody for the Victims of 
Hiroshima" by K. Penderecki, its original title was 
"8'37" as a reference to the song "4'33" by John Cage, 
but the author decided to change the title after 
listeners' reactions who paid attention to the fact that 
certain sounds in the song resemble falling bombs and 
human screams.29 In this case, it is hard to attribute 




such an intention to the author, but on the other hand 
it can be argued that, from the point of view of 
copyright, the content or title of the work is irrelevant, 
what matters is the intention to make something 
creative and unique, regardless of the interpretation of 
the recipients. However, the application of this 
criterion does not fully solve the problem of the 
unclear boundary between idea/expression 
dichotomy: one can imagine cases in which the 
author's intention is the only expressive manifestation, 
there is no content or the work itself has no specific 
and clear shape or boundaries.30 It seems to me that 
this problem can be avoided by applying a restrictive 
interpretation of the form of expression or fixation, 
verifying each time whether a perceptive object was 
created.  
 
However, the case is different if the author's 
intention was to create a unique work, but the 
outcome does not meet the author's expectations. In 
such a case, the final effort of the author is eligible for 
copyright protection provided, however, that, firstly, 
it is suitable for perception (it has been determined) 
and, secondly, this effect meets the requirement of 
creativity regardless of whether its final shape 
corresponds to the original intentions of the author. 
The refusal of copyright protection in the event that 
the outcome is not in line with the original 
expectations of the author would make the copyright 
protection dependent on the actual effects of the 
author's work, which would violate the copyright 
paradigm and would lead to substantive decisions. At 
this stage, it can be concluded that relying solely on 
the intent of the author is absolutely insufficient to 
enable a full legal assessment. This condition, if 
implemented, should not be perceived as the main and 
decisive as far as status of the object of copyright 
protection is concerned - it can be used as auxiliary or 
subsidiary to the existing requirements. 
 
The main argument that can be put forward against 
the functionalist approach is the inclusion of 
subjective elements to the assessment of the object of 
copyright which is already quite unspecified.31 This 
solution may seem to be an additional obstacle to the 
already complicated process of verifying the 
fulfilment of the requirements of creativity or 
originality. This is particularly evident when we 
consider the example of Jason Pollock, who could not 
post factum say what were his intentions when 
creating his subsequent works.32 Nevertheless, I 
believe that we cannot completely reject the 
functionalist approach. The assessment of the intent 
of the law entity is present and has long been well 
verified in criminal law - without accusations that the 
assessment becomes subjective. The author's 
intentions can be assessed on the basis of specific 
circumstances, such as the means of expression used, 
the way the work is presented, the author's behaviour 
during the creation process or during the 
dissemination of the work, intentions related to the 
conclusion of contracts for the dissemination of the 
work, etc. In response to the accusation of 
subjectivity, M. Eaton suggested to include factors 
that could contribute to a more objective assessment 
of the author's intentions:33 
 
1) Artistic activity: What kind(s) of activity or craft 
was involved in the production of the object? 
2) Artist’s life: What kind of person made it? 
3) Artistic intentions: What are the intentions with 
which the object was made? (knowing an artist’s 
intentions is relevant to the understanding of his or 
her work has been so widely and lengthily discussed 
in criticism and aesthetics) 
4) Content of WoA: What does the object describe or 
express? 
5) Function of WoA: What is the function of the 
object? 
6) Setting of WoA: How does the object fit into its 
sociocultural setting? How does a work of art affect, 
and How is it affected by, this setting?34 
 
In this context, determination of the author of a 
work of art seems problematic (point 3), it may lead 
to the exclusion from the scope of copyright 
protection of works created by amateurs or by random 
persons, but other factors are not particularly different 
from those which are included e.g. in criminal law. 
Therefore, we have mechanisms that allow us to 
verify the author's intention, without the need to 
reduce it to a subjective assessment. 
 
Functionalist approach is often contrasted with the 
institutional approach (often referred to as 
procedural). According to the simplest description of 
S. Davies, the approach is the following: “[t]he 
proceduralist holds that it is a necessary condition for 
a thing’s being an artwork that it is ‘‘baptized’’ as art 
by someone with the authority thereby to confer art 
status on the piece. Such authority is vested in 
informally structured roles occupied by persons in the 
artworld. That a piece would produce ‘‘aesthetic 
experience’’ were it to be an artwork is one excellent 




reason for conferring art status on it, but a thing is an 
artwork only if it has received the appropriate 
imprimatur, irrespective of its functionality”.35 
 
In this sense, the status of a WoA is determined by 
the fact whether it is (1) an artifact and (2) a candidate 
for appreciation by some person or persons acting on 
behalf of the Artworld.36 G. Dickie was the precursor 
of this approach, in response to criticism he tried to 
improve the definition many times.37  In fact, this 
concept is particularly simple in its assumptions: the 
mere creation of a work is not enough to grant it a 
special WoA status, but only the reaction of the 
recipients - and not average recipients, but experts, 
members of Artworld38- will allow for the classification 
of the work as a work of art. The advantage of this 
approach over the functionalist approach is the solution 
to the issue of conceptual art and "readymades" (after 
all, it is considered by the Artworld as a work of art), as 
well as the art of using objects such as pieces of 
driftwood found by chance.39 For example, the 
functionalist approach could not cope with the status of 
a "work" in case of a brick taken from a construction 
site and brought straight to the art gallery: such work 
was not subject to the process of "creation", so it is 
hard to determine in sufficient and possibly objectified 
way whether the author manifested his intention during 
the act of creation, while according to institutional 
approach the reaction of the Artworld would be 
decisive in this case.40 
 
However, this concept has a number of very 
significant disadvantages. First of all, despite its 
structural simplicity, it will not cope with the cases of 
works created by children (according to functionalist 
approach, if the child is able to consciously manifest 
his/her intentions, there is a possibility of granting a 
WoA status to such work)41 and counterfeit works.42 
In the latter case, there is an obvious weakness 
consisting in relying on the opinion of Artworld 
consisting of experts, however, they are not infallible. 
There are also doubts as to who belongs to the 
Artworld. One of the main supporters of the 
institutional approach, G. Dickie, repeatedly changed 
his mind as to who should belong to this group and 
under what terms and conditions.43 
 
Despite these reservations, the concept of 
institutional approach towards a WoA draws attention 
to an important aspect that could be taken into 
account when considering the concept of a work: 
audience response to the work (i.e. the reaction of an 
average recipient or members of a specialised 
Artworld. This key element of the assessment of the 
work draws attention to the fact that, above all, it 
reflects the real social and economic value of the 
work. It is mainly the users' perception that defines 
the demand for a disseminated product - and currently 
it does not affect the definition of the work itself in 
any way. I am not saying that this should be the only 
or the main criterion for the decision about copyright 
protection (there can always be differences between 
the reception by the specialists and the audience - as 
in case of the song the Old Town Road which was 
mentioned in the initial section of the paper) and 
certainly we should not rely solely on it (public mood 
may fluctuate and be dependent on too many external 
factors), but it may be helpful in the settlement of 
dubious cases, e.g. regarding the assessment of the 
case of taking protected elements from someone else's 
work.  
 
The reference to reception of the work by an 
average recipient is not a revolutionary solution in 
terms of intellectual property rights: in industrial 
property law such an approach has been functioning 
for many years and - even though criticised - efforts 
are made to maintain such an interpretation. When 
combined with the opinion of external experts, it 
creates a particularly interesting and strongly 
objectified argument that may justify the awarding of 
copyright protection. 
 
…Or Roundabout?  
Copyright law, especially case-law, already uses to 
a certain extent the aesthetic concepts described 
above, in particular the functionalist approach 
referring to the author's intentions of creating a work 
protected by copyright. To some extent, references to 
other aesthetic theories are also noticeable, although 
in no event is it a reference directly to the concept 
itself, but only to some of its manifestations. 
 
Examples of references made to the author's 
intentions can be found in the case-law of at least a 
few European countries as well as the United States. 
For example, in the Dutch case-law concerning 
copyright protection of industrial designs, courts 
typically examined whether the work expressed the 
artistic intent of the author or harmoniously combined 
functional elements with aesthetic appeal.44 The 
purpose of this study was to determine whether the 
form of an industrial design was sufficiently creative 
or decorative, and not functional or technical.45 On the 
other hand, in the Polish case-law the concept of 




"subjective novelty" has developed, defined as the 
author's subjective conviction that the work he created 
is creative enough to be protected by copyright.46 For 
example, in the case of copyright protection of the 
invented word "JOGI" (no meaning in Polish 
language), the Polish Supreme Court stated that "(...) 
the condition of work’s “originality” is satisfied if 
there subjectively exists a new product of the intellect, 
(...) [a] one may say about the self-creativity only if 
the created work was not previously known in the 
same form, and thus it manifests itself in an 
objectively tangible result of creativity".  
 
At the same time, the Supreme Court stressed that 
copyright law does not use the novelty condition in 
the objective sense (i.e. a new object appears in the 
ontological sense), but in subjective terms (this work 
is thus called the "subjective novelty") and if it is 
based on the declared subjective belief of the creator, 
it is subject to objective verification on the basis of 
the intended purpose of the intellectual product itself. 
Eventually, the Supreme Court refused to protect a 
single word, assuming that the work must have the 
ability to exist independently in various fields of 
exploitation, and the word JOGI was invented only 
for a specific purpose (advertisement of food 
products).47 The reference to the concept of subjective 
novelty understood in this way is the dominant 
approach present in the case-law of Polish courts.48 
Moreover, this approach is not limited to the borders 
of the continental Europe: in the Merlet v 
Mothercare49 (UK) case, concerning the children's 
raincoat design, it was held that copyright protection 
was denied because "(...) the question is primarily the 
intention of the artist-craftsman. If his intention was 
to create a work of art and he has not manifestly failed 
in that intent, that is all that is required.50 
 
A particularly interesting case of making reference 
to the artist's intention as a constitutive criterion for 
the existence of a copyright protected work is the case 
of Metix (UK) Ltd v G H Maughan (Plastics) Ltd,51 
where Laddie J rejected a claim to artistic copyright in 
moulds used for making cartridges. In the decision, 
Laddie J made some general observations (at pp 721-
722): “The law has been bedevilled by attempts to 
widen out the field covered by the Copyright Acts. It 
is not possible to say with precision what is and what 
is not sculpture, but Mr Meade was close to the heart 
of the issue. He suggested that a sculpture is a three-
dimensional work made by an artist’s hand. It appears 
to me that there is no reason why the word ‘sculpture’ 
in the 1988 Act, should be extended far beyond the 
meaning which that word has to ordinary members of 
the public”.  
 
Viscount Maughan expressed a similar opinion in 
the case of King Features Syndicate Inc v O & M 
Kleeman Ltd:52 The main issue in that case (which 
was concerned with “Popeye” dolls derived from 
published comic strips enjoying artistic copyright) 
was the time at which the intention of use for 
industrial production had to be formed. The Lords 
decided that the intention must have been there from 
the start.53 References to the functionalist approach 
can also be found in the case of Hensher Ltd. v 
Restawile Upholstery (Lancs) Ltd.54 In the judgement 
four separate opinions were expresses on how to 
understand the concept of "work of artistic 
craftsmanship," of which opinion of Lord Kilbrandon 
seems to refer to the functionalist concept most 
accurately: “The meaning of "artistic" is a matter of 
law for the judge and not for witnesses. The first 
essential of a work: of art is that it shall have come 
into existence as the product of an author who is 
consciously concerned to produce one. A decision on 
artistic merit is not required”.55 In the US case-law, in 
the Brandir International, Inc. v Cascade Pacific 
Lumber Co.56 case an independent artistic judgement 
was subject to verification, understood precisely with 
reference to the subjective intention of the creator.57 
In turn, in the Burrow-Giles Litographic Company v 
Sarony58 case, reference was made to the analysis of 
the state of mind of the creator at the time of creating 
the work.59 Interestingly, reference to the author's 
intention is also present in other copyright issues: first 
of all in assessing whether the use of the work was 
transformative.60 The ruling in the Kieselstein-Cord v 
Accessories by Pearl case was also based on 
internationalism and institutionalism.61 
 
However, not only the author's intention is a 
significant factor in case-law in the context of 
granting the status of a work of art. In the Vermaatv 
Boncrest case, it was stated, for example, that not 
only the artist's intention is important for the concept 
of the work of art, but the work itself must also have 
some artistic quality, in the sense of being produced 
by someone with creative ability and having 
aesthetical appeal.62 Lord Morris expressed a similar 
opinion in the Hensher v Restaville case, referred to 
above: “In deciding whether a work is one of artistic 
craftsmanship, I consider that the work must be 
viewed and judged in an attached and objective way. 




The aim and purpose of its author may provide a 
pointer, but the thing produced must itself be assessed 
without giving decisive weight to the author’s scheme 
of things (…)”.63 In a few cases under the Polish case-
law we can also notice reliance on expert's opinion. 
For example, in the case regarding the copyright 
protection of choreography to popular songs for kids, 
the expert's assessment constituted the basis for 
refusal to consider it the object of copyright 
protection.64 In other case in the Polish Supreme 
Court, copyright protection was provided to the 
dictionary of difficult words (the so-called lexemes) 
only because the selected vocabulary was deemed by 
an expert as creative and unique.65 In the British case-
law, expert witnesses are often appointed to 
participate in trials concerning substantive similarity.
66 
This approach is also presented in literature.67 
 
Judicial decisions based on the reaction of average 
recipients (typical for industrial property rights) are 
also very popular. In the Supreme Court judgement 
(13.01.2006, III CSK 40/05) in the case concerning 
the copyright protection of shoulder-straps for 
uniforms, the Supreme Court stated that "For an 
average recipient, the image of the Eagle and military 
ranks insignia do not poses individual character, i.e. 
they do not represent any special relation with the 
creator of these images and they do not reflect his 
"creative personality". A similar opinion was 
expressed in the judgement of the Court of Appeal in 
Poznań (18.05.2006, I ACa 1449/05) in the case 
concerning copyright protection of the furniture 
design made in the "maritime" style: "This furniture 
has certain (...) distinguishing features that make it 
unique as compared to (...) the furniture of other 
producers designed in the marine style (...). Reactions 
of customers towards both the shape and finishing 
elements of this furniture (...) clearly indicate that it is 
the product of the company "V.", which proves its 
distinct, specific and unique character". Similar 
opinions are expressed by courts in the British legal 
system - in case of the degree of similarity between 
original works and their imitations (as part of the 
"substantial similarity").68 For example, the concept 
of substantial similarity in relation to musical works is 
very often based on comparing fragments of the 
original work in question and verifying whether an 
average recipient will recognise fragments taken from 
a different work in the work in question.69 On the 
other hand, creating a work that gives a completely 
different visual appearance cannot be considered as 
substantial similarity.70 A similar example is the 
judgement in the Gromer, Acullf v Cambellcase, the 
assessment was made according to a four-stage 
aesthetic evaluation, including reference to the 
reaction of the audience and assessment by the 
artworld regarding both musical works.71 On the basis 
of the Plix Products v Frank M. Winstone case it is 
argued that the limit of copyright protection is the 
attribution of certain specific (protected) ideas to the 
work by its recipients.72 
 
Certain reminiscences of the institutional approach 
to the object of copyright protection can also be found 
in the construction of a parody. This exception allows 
the use of someone else's intellectual property to 
create a new work that is a parody of the reality. 
However, there are certain complications associated 
with this construction: the distinction between a 
parody and the ordinary use of a protected work 
requires a reference to the average recipient or a 
definition of a parody, based on expert judgement. 
Similar attitude was assumed by the Court of Justice 
of the EU in the Deckmyn case: According to its 
interpretation, a parody should be deemed as a work 
that displays noticeable differences with respect to the 
original parodied work, that it could reasonably be 
attributed to a person other than the author of the 
original work itself, that it should relate to the original 
work itself or mention the source of the parodied 
work73 (paragraphs 21 and 33 of the judgement in the 
Deckmyn case). A similar approach can be found in 
the concept of fair dealing/fair use: for example, in 
the British case of Hyde Park Residence v Yelland74 
adopted the perspective of audience, meaning whether 
a „fair-minded and honest person” would regard the 
dealing in question as fair.75 
 
“If You Don’t Know Where You Are Going Any 
Road Can Take You There”76 
Modern aesthetic models are looking for answers 
to the question concerning the definition of a work of 
art in external elements to the work itself: in the 
intention of the author, in the reaction of the audience, 
or in the opinion of the Artworld, including the one 
published by a group of experts. This means going 
beyond the popular so far phenomenological model, 
based on the verification of the structure and ontology 
of the work itself. Abandoning this construct was 
justified by the maladjustment to contemporary 
artistic forms, the development of art, the need to 
redefine the old concepts in the new reality. 
Contemporary legal solutions, in turn, bring the 




copyright law closer to phenomenological aesthetic 
attitude towards a work of art. Similarly, as in case of 
aesthetics, copyright law is considered maladjusted to 
the new social and artistic reality, the development of 
technologies and digitized artistic forms. The analysis 
showed that - again: as in case of aesthetics - also in 
case of law, new interpretations are sought to help us 
cope with the problem of copyright and bring the final 
legal assessment closer to the public's expectations. 
 
Considering the author's intention to create a work 
could at the same time limit and extend copyright 
protection. On the one hand, it would include 
outstanding works of contemporary art in the 
definition of the work, legally disregarded or 
marginalised as far as copyright protection is 
concerned and at the same time it would exclude 
works that are contrary to the paradigm of copyright 
protection of real and significant creative 
contribution, such as technical documentation, 
utilitarian objects, etc. This limitation, however, 
would require a very precise specification of what the 
author's intention would refer to: whether to create a 
new work in genere (which would significantly 
extend copyright protection and bring it closer to 
industrial property law due to the criterion of 
novelty), or to create a creative work (which would 
mean the requirement to verify the author's state of 
knowledge and awareness at the time of creation of 
the work and could in some cases exclude the 
protection of random works, as well as those created 
with the use of existing works, e.g. collage), or the 
creation of a work subject to copyright protection 
(which in turn could exclude protection of works of 
people unaware of legal regulations, such as children, 
as well as works created for the purposes of forgery or 
normatively prohibited works, such as those 
promoting specific political opinions). The author's 
intention may also be considered in a subsidiary way, 
i.e. in case where the previous methodology failed, 
leading to unfair results or not taking into account all 
paradigms of copyright. A similar effect could be 
obtained taking into account expert judgement as an 
element of the structure of the object of copyright 
protection. The institutional approach, however, 
allows the opening of copyright law to new 
technologies, in particular products of artificial 
intelligence. Evaluated solely on the final product 
itself, it could be deemed by experts or an average 
recipient as a result of creative activity. Such a 
solution would bring copyright closer to industrial 
property rights and significantly increase the costs of 
legal proceedings, but it should be remembered that in 
contemporary legal proceedings these tendencies are 
becoming more noticeable, regardless of the 
implementation of suggested aesthetic interpretations. 
Especially with regard to the latter threat, the 
increasing costs of legal proceedings concerning 
copyright protection might have a discouraging effect. 
Moreover, there is also a problem with appointing 
experts as entities de facto deciding about the status of 
the work (author of the institutional approach, G. 
Dickie, also faced this problem, trying to reformulate 
the definition of the Artworld many times), as well as 
the problem of recognition by the expertsof 
unconventional, controversial or contradictory 
manifestations contrary to the current development of 
art or science. Abandoning the objectified expert 
judgement for the so-called readers-response would 
enable avoidance of problems related to the increased 
costs of the proceedings, but instead would make the 
assessment less reliable and more vulnerable to 
manipulations.  
 
Reliance on the opinion of an average recipient 
could be a solution, but its assessment would again 
require expert analysis. In this case, therefore, the 
institutional approach has more disadvantages than 
advantages over the functionalist approach, despite 
the obvious advantage associated with the objective 
nature of this concept. On the other hand, combining 
two approaches,i.e. functionalist and institutionalist, 
could help to solve the problem of copyright 
protection by including hybrid, complex and 
heterogeneous works. In such cases, taking into 
account both the original intentions of the author and 
the final public perception of the presented product 
could facilitate the classification and, consequently, 
the application of appropriate legal regulations. 
 
This does not mean, however, that it is possible to 
implement aesthetic concepts directly into the legal 
system. The main obstacles are constitutional 
constraints and principles which every normative 
construction should follow, and which do not at all 
involve aesthetic concepts. Such limitation includes, 
for example, avoiding substantive aesthetic 
assessments of the work, reduction of subjective 
elements in the legal assessment, respecting the trust 
of third parties in legal transactions, or the principle 
of legal neutrality. The following rules may result 
from international provisions, such as the Berne 
Convention (e.g. prohibition on introducing additional 




formalities to obtain copyright protection) or EU 
directives and CJEU case-law (e.g. adopting a 
uniform construction of the object of copyright 
protection for all types of works, including 
interpretation of the work as a two-component 
construct of form and expression and author's own 
intellectual creation). It seems to me that on the basis 
of all these rules and restrictions we could try to 
redefine the existing components of the work's 
structure and create a model that could be more in line 
with contemporary technological and artistic trends. 
This task seems possible, if we take into account the 
results of the above analysis. 
 
The functionalist approach based on the study of 
the artist's intention is already visible in the 
interpretation of the concepts of originality or 
creativity. If we consider the example of the Polish 
case-law, it can be noticed that the concept of 
originality also involves the analysis of author's 
awareness and intention when creating a new work, 
previously unknown. In the British law, classification 
as an "artistic work" is almost entirely dependent on 
the author's intention, while in the US case-law it is 
noticeable that reference is made to the author's 
intentions while determining the scope of creative 
freedom of the author. All this leads to the conclusion 
that the functionalist approach can be effective if we 
try to adapt it to the current copyright law. We can 
assume that only the intention to create an original 
work should be relevant to the assessment - leaving 
behind the author's awareness of whether he would be 
entitled to exclusive rights to the created work. A 
similar conclusion can also be drawn with regard to 
the institutional approach, taking into account in the 
final evaluation the reaction of the audience or the 
expert judgement, however, the reference to such 
factors will be justified under the free assessment of 
evidence carried out during a lawsuit, i.e. without 
obligatory character. Without implementation of 
normative changes, it seems that the obligation to 
refer to external evaluations of the work could be 
considered as contrary to international and EU 
provisions.  
 
It would also be necessary to specify the model of 
an average recipient - as is the case with some 
regulations in the field of industrial property rights. 
Consequently, in the absence of proposals for 
legislative changes regarding the construction of the 
object of copyright protection, the reference to 
external evaluations still remains possible, provided 
that it would be treated as auxiliary evidence in legal 
proceedings and not the major one on which the final 
decision shall be based. 
 
Conclusion 
Contemporary copyright law is not in line with the 
surrounding reality: it does not guarantee the 
protection of both outstanding works of art and the 
current manifestations of new technologies of great 
social importance and economic value. So far, the risk 
that outstanding and valuable creative works could 
not be covered by copyright protection has been 
incorporated into the system and worked until the 
final decisions on granting/refusing protection 
satisfied the society in the overwhelming majority of 
cases. This trend seems to change and a more serious 
debate on the copyright paradigm seems to be 
inevitable. 
 
After thorough analysis, certain irrefutable 
assumptions are made: A judge cannot decide on 
aesthetic value or economic significance of a work 
(these values can be taken into account alternatively 
at the end of the assessment) and legal regulation 
should correspond to the basic normative and 
constitutional principles. While analysing modern 
aesthetic concepts I concentrated on two most 
important ones: functionalist and institutional 
approach. Their common element is reliance on 
external criteria for assessing the status of the work in 
terms of its structure or ontology. The common 
advantage of both concepts is taking into account the 
values that were previously ignored in copyright law: 
social importance of the work, its economic values, 
the intentions of the author. This, however, can be a 
double-edged sword: why should we require the judge 
not to take into account the social importance or 
financial value of the work, and allow to refer to them 
as part of a functionalist concept? The solution to this 
dilemma is granting subsidiarity character to criteria 
referring to external factors: they should not serve as 
the only measure of the level of creativity, but 
"support" the final evaluation, it should help to dispel 
doubts or find a balance between the interests of all 
relevant parties. 
 
These solutions pose several threats. If improperly 
adopted, may lead to subjective judgements based on 
elusive premises, justifying unfair decisions. 
Therefore, they require a very careful and meticulous 
study of either the author's intention or the opinion of 
the Artworld. Modern legal systems have the right 




tools to carry out such evidentiary proceedings in 
accordance with the legal provisions and 
constitutional guarantees.In fact, the construction 
itself would not require many changes. In some cases 
(e.g. under the general definition system), 
amendments would not be particularly necessary: the 
current concepts and interpretations provided by the 
courts are sufficient. 
On the basis of the Old Town Road song, we can 
observe the most important problems related to 
copyright protection that we face: the scope of using 
someone else's creativity, the problem of qualifying 
the work within the existing categories, the issue of 
granting normative protection. It seems to me that the 
discussion on the redefinition and reinterpretation of 
the existing legal structures cannot continue without 
making reference to external factors, such as 
reception by the audience or intentions of the author. 
These factors are already taken into account by the 
courts in different countries. For a long time, they 
have also been a point of reference for aesthetics, 
which faces similar problems as the copyright law. 
Multidisciplinary approach is required to improve the 
situation of the existing copyright law and to 
introduce modifications to the system which has been 
in use since the beginning of the 19th century. 
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